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Abstract
We prove a general connection between the communication complexity of two-player games
and the sample complexity of their multi-player locally private analogues. We use this con-
nection to prove sample complexity lower bounds for locally differentially private protocols as
straightforward corollaries of results from communication complexity. In particular, we 1) use
a communication lower bound for the hidden layers problem to prove an exponential sample
complexity separation between sequentially and fully interactive locally private protocols, and
2) use a communication lower bound for the pointer chasing problem to prove an exponential
sample complexity separation between k-round and (k+1)-round sequentially interactive locally
private protocols, for every k.
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1 Introduction
A differentially private [16] algorithm must induce similar output distributions given similar input
databases. Intuitively, this similarity creates enough uncertainty to hide the presence or absence
— and hence ensure the privacy — of any one individual in the dataset. Differential privacy’s
mathematical and practical appeal has driven the creation of a large body of work (see Dwork and
Roth [15] and Vadhan [26] for surveys) and increasing industrial and governmental adoption [1, 3,
5, 12, 17]. Here, we focus on the strictly stronger notion of local differential privacy [20]. In local
differential privacy, the rows of the size-n database are distributed among n individual users, and
the private computation consists of a public interaction between the users that must reveal little
about any single datum.
Local differential privacy has been studied in three increasingly general models. In noninterac-
tive protocols, all users publish their messages simultaneously1. In sequentially interactive [14] pro-
tocols, users publish exactly one message each in sequence, and messages may depend on previously-
published messages. The number of rounds in such protocols is necessarily upper bounded by the
number of users, n, but can be fewer. Fully interactive protocols have no such restrictions. Each
user may publish arbitrarily many messages with arbitrary dependencies on other previous mes-
sages, and there is no upper bound on the number of rounds. In this paper, we study the relative
power of these models.
A natural way to approach this question is through the lens of sample complexity: fixing one
statistical estimation problem, how many users n (with data drawn i.i.d. from a fixed but unknown
distribution) are necessary for a protocol to solve the problem in each model? It is known that
there are problems that require exponentially larger sample complexity in noninteractive protocols
than sequentially interactive protocols [20]. Before our work, however, only polynomial separations
were known between sequentially and fully interactive protocols [19], and it was conjectured that
the power of these two models was indeed polynomially related.
1.1 Our Contributions
First, we prove a general equivalence between the communication complexity of any two-player
problem and the sample complexity of a sequentially interactive locally private multi-player ana-
logue of that problem. Informally, we show that the “noise” that must be added to ensure local
differential privacy in any sequentially interactive protocol makes it possible to convert it into a
two-party protocol over a noisy channel, and vice-versa. In combination with past work relating
communication complexity over noisy and noiseless channels [7, 8, 24], this conversion extends to
noiseless channels as well.
Theorem 1.1 (Informal version of Theorem 3.8). Let P2 be a two-player communication problem,
let Pm be its multi-player analogue, let CCγ(P2) be the communication complexity of solving P2 with
error γ, and let SCε,Sγ (Pm) be the sample complexity of solving Pm with error γ using a sequentially
interactive ε-locally private protocol. Then for any ε = O(1) and 0 < γ, η = Ω(1) such that
γ + η < 1, SCε,Sγ (Pm) = Θ
(
1
ε2
· CCγ+η(P2)
)
.
This connection enables us to translate existing communication lower bounds into sample com-
plexity lower bounds for locally private protocols. For example, we show an exponential separation
1In this paper, we will still allow some coordination in the form of shared randomness, which only makes our lower
bounds stronger.
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in sample complexity between sequentially and fully interactive locally private protocols for the
hidden layers problem.
Theorem 1.2 (Informal version of Corollary 4.1.1 and Theorem 4.2). Let k be a natural number
parameterizing the hidden layers problem and ε = O(1). Any sequentially interactive ε-locally
private protocol solving the hidden layers problem with constant probability requires Ω
(
2k
ε2
)
samples.
However, there exists a fully interactive ε-locally private protocol that solves the hidden layers
problem with constant success probability and O
(
k
ε2
)
samples.
Theorem 3.8 provides a tight equivalence between the sample complexity of locally private
sequentially interactive protocols, and communication complexity — but the reduction does not
preserve the number of rounds of interaction needed. We prove a different variant of Theorem 3.8
that preserves round complexity at the expense of a looser dependence on ε. Using this connection
and round-specific communication lower bounds for the pointer chasing problem, we show that for
every k, there is an exponential separation between (k − 1)- and k- round sequentially interactive
protocols.
Theorem 1.3 (Informal version of Corollary 6.2.1 and Theorem 6.3). Let k and ℓ be natural
numbers parameterizing the pointer chasing problem. Any (k− 1)-round sequentially interactive ε-
locally private protocol solving the pointer chasing problem with constant probability requires Ω
(
ℓ
eεk2
)
samples. However, there exists a k-round sequentially interactive ε-locally private protocol that
solves pointer chasing with constant success probability and O˜
(
k log(ℓ)
ε2
)
samples, where O˜(·) hides
logarithmic factors.
The special case of k = 2 provides another exponential separation between noninteractive and
sequentially interactive protocols (such a separation was already known, for a different problem
using a custom analysis of Kasiviswanathan et al. [20]). For k > 2, the result is new and demon-
strates that there is an infinite hierarchy of sequentially interactive protocols, characterized by their
number of rounds of interactivity, and that there is an exponential separation between each level
of the hierarchy.
Finally, for simplicity we state all of our results for pure ε-local privacy. However, for reasonable
values of δ (roughly δ = o
(
ε
n log(n)
)
) they easily extend to (ε, δ)-local privacy using the approximate-
to-pure transformation described by Bun et al. [9] and Cheu et al. [10].
1.2 Related Work
Kasiviswanathan et al. [20] first separated noninteractive from sequentially interactive locally pri-
vate protocols. They exhibited a learning problem, masked parity, for which a sequentially inter-
active locally private protocol requires only O(poly (d)) samples while any noninteractive locally
private protocol requires 2Ω(d) samples. Their result relies on an (up to polynomial terms) equiv-
alence between the number of local randomizer calls made by a locally private protocol and the
query complexity of a statistical query (SQ) algorithm. For sequentially interactive protocols, the
number of local randomizer calls is equal to the sample complexity. However, this is no longer true
for fully interactive protocols, and so their equivalence between the sample complexity of locally
private protocols and the query complexity of SQ algorithms fails to extend beyond sequential in-
teractivity. Daniely and Feldman [11] also leveraged this connection to SQ learning to prove similar
separations for a broader class of problems.
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Our results do not rely on this connection to the SQ model. In fact, our exponential separation
between the sequential and fully interactive models implies that the connection fails to extend
beyond sequential interactivity: there are problems that locally private protocols can solve with
polynomial sample complexity, but SQ protocols require exponential query complexity. This re-
focuses attention on an important problem that remains open: what can be learned privately in
the local model of computation, if full interactivity is allowed?
Duchi et al. [14] first distinguished sequential and full interactivity and developed several lower
bound techniques that applied to noninteractive and sequentially interactive protocols. Duchi and
Rogers [13] extended some of these techniques to full interactivity, thus establishing the first lower
bounds for fully interactive locally private protocols that do not also extend to the centralized
model of privacy. However, their results do not separate sequentially interactive protocols from
fully interactive protocols.
Joseph et al. [19] characterized the relationship between the sample complexity of fully inter-
active and sequentially interactive locally private protocols in terms of a parameter called “com-
positionality”, providing the first separations between full and sequential interactivity. While this
characterization is tight in terms of the compositionality parameter, their lower bound viewed as a
function of n only shows a sample complexity gap on the order of Ω(
√
n) between the two models.
We prove a separation that is exponential in n.
Several other works have also examined interactivity in local differential privacy. Smith et al.
[25] showed that convex optimization protocols relying on neighborhood-based oracles (and, in
particular, locally private protocols) require interaction. However, their results are qualitatively
somewhat different, as they also hold absent any privacy restriction. Acharya et al. [2] showed poly-
nomial separations between noninteractive private- and public-randomness protocols for identity
testing (informally, in their formulation public randomness is necessary to coordinate the random-
izers employed by different users). We note that our framework assumes public randomness for all
noninteractive protocols; this only strengthens our separation.
Finally, our work is not the first to connect differential privacy and two-player communication
games. McGregor et al. [22] introduced and studied two-party differential privacy. They showed,
roughly, that a two-party differentially private protocol is equivalent to a protocol with low round
and communication complexity. This equivalence relies on work relating the compressibility of a
protocol to its information cost. In contrast, we work in the more commonly studied n-party model
of local differential privacy, and our reductions rely on different techniques.
1.3 Organization
Preliminaries from communication complexity and differential privacy appear in Section 2. We
prove the equivalence between two-party communication complexity and multi-party locally private
sample complexity in Section 3 and use this equivalence to separate sequential and full interactivity
in Section 4. A looser round complexity-preserving version of this connection appears in Section 5,
and we apply this second connection to show a round-specific separation in Section 6.
2 Preliminaries
We start by recalling preliminaries from two-party communication complexity before moving on to
differential privacy and (our notion of) multi-party communication complexity.
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2.1 Two-party Setting
Many of our results feature the two-party communication model.
Definition 2.1. In the two-party communication model, one player Alice receives input x ∈ X ,
and the other player Bob receives input y ∈ Y. Alice and Bob want to jointly compute some output
z ∈ Z such that (x, y, z) satisfies some relation R ⊂ X ×Y × Z.
To compute z, Alice and Bob coordinate their actions using a protocol.
Definition 2.2. Given a two-party communication model, a protocol A specifies a binary output
function that each player should apply to their data at each time step, as a function of the time
step, the transcript of previously released values and any shared randomness.
Note that, by our inclusion of shared randomness, all protocols we consider are “public-coin”.
Two salient protocol characteristics are the number of bits that must be exchanged and the likeli-
hood of a “good” outcome.
Definition 2.3. The communication complexity of a protocol A, denoted by CC(A), is the maxi-
mum number of bits exchanged over all inputs (x, y) and all random coins. If on all inputs x and y
PA [(x, y, z) 6∈ R] ≤ γ, we say A computes R with error at most γ. The randomized communication
complexity with error γ of a relation R is then defined as
CCγ(R) = minA:A computes R with error at most γCC(A).
2.2 Differential Privacy
As originally formulated by Dwork et al. [16], we say an algorithmM satisfies differential privacy if
its output distribution is Lipschitz continuous with respect to a neighboring relationship on inputs:
Definition 2.4. Given data universe X , two datasets S, S′ ∈ X n are neighbors if they differ in at
most one coordinate. Given ε, δ ≥ 0, a randomized algorithm M : X n → O is (ε, δ)-differentially
private if for every pair of neighboring databases S and S′ and every event Ω ⊂ O
PM [M(S) ∈ Ω] ≤ eεPM
[M(S′) ∈ Ω]+ δ.
When δ = 0, M satisfies pure differential privacy. When δ > 0, M satisfies approximate differ-
ential privacy.
Differential privacy constrains the output of an algorithmM. However, there is no intermediary
betweenM and the raw database, soM must be trusted as a curator of this data. SinceM enjoys
this “central” access to all data, the above model of differential privacy is sometimes called “central”
differential privacy.
We focus instead on the more restrictive local model of differential privacy [20]. In this model,M
no longer enjoys privileged access to the entire database, and individuals need not trust any central
curator. Instead, we view the size-n database as distributed, row by row, among n individuals.
Any computation occurs on privatized outputs from each of the n individuals, and the private
computation becomes a public interaction between users. Accordingly, we imitate the interactive
transcript-based framework of Joseph et al. [19] and view the computation as an interaction between
the n individuals that is coordinated by a protocol A. In each round of this interaction, the protocol
A observes the transcript of interactions so far and selects a set of users and randomizers.
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Definition 2.5. An (ε, δ)-randomizer R : X → O is an (ε, δ)-differentially private function taking
a single data point as input.
The users apply the assigned randomizers to their input and publish the output. A then observes
the updated transcript, selects a new users-randomizers pair, and the interaction continues.
Definition 2.6. A transcript π is a vector consisting of 5-tuples (StU , S
t
R, S
t
ε, S
t
δ, S
t
Y ) — encoding
the set of users chosen, set of randomizers assigned, set of randomizer privacy parameters, and
set of randomized outputs produced — for each round t. π<t denotes the transcript prefix before
round t. Letting Sπ denote the collection of all transcripts and SR the collection of all randomizers,
a protocol is a function A : Sπ →
(
2[n] × 2SR × 2R≥0 × 2R≥0) ∪ {⊥} mapping transcripts to sets
of users, randomizers, and randomizer privacy parameters (⊥ is a special character indicating a
protocol halt). The length of the transcript, as indexed by t, is its round complexity.
This framework leads to a simple definition of local differential privacy: the transcript of a
locally differentially private interaction is differentially private in the user inputs.
Definition 2.7. Given ε, δ ≥ 0, randomized protocol A on (distributed) database S satisfies (ε, δ)-
local differential privacy if the transcript it generates is an (ε, δ)-differentially private function of
S.
For brevity, we often shorthand “differentially private” as “private”. In general, we will distin-
guish between three modes of interactivity in locally private protocols. In noninteractive protocols,
users output their communications in a single simultaneous round of communication. In sequen-
tially interactive protocols, interaction occurs in a sequence: users may base their communication
on previous messages, but only speak once. Lastly, communication in fully interactive protocols
may depend on previous communications, and users may also communicate arbitrarily many times.
Illustrations of these models appear in Figure 1.
x x2 x3
· · ·
y1 y3y2
x x2 x3
· · ·
y1 y3y2
x x2 x3
· · ·
y1,1 y3,4y2,2
y1,3
Figure 1: From left to right: examples of noninteractive, sequential, and full interaction. In each illustration, x
variables are user data, and y variables are privatized user responses. In the noninteractive model, each privatized
response yi is a function only of the user’s data xi (and their internal randomness). In the sequential model, each yi
is a function of xi and previous responses y1, . . . , yi−1. In the full model, each yi,t is a function of xi and any yi′,t′
for any t′ < t.
For brevity, we sometimes omit the phrase “locally private” when discussing these models. In
these cases, the privacy of the protocol in question should be clear from context.
2.3 Multi-party Setting
We combine the communication model of Section 2.1 and the notion of local privacy defined in
Section 2.2 in a multi-party communication model.
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Definition 2.8. In the multi-party communication model there exists an “Alice input” x ∈ X and
a “Bob input” y ∈ Y. Each of an unboundedly large number of players receives an independent and
uniformly random draw over {x, y}. The users’ goal is to output z ∈ Z such that (x, y, z) ∈ R.
A protocol is defined as in the local privacy setting (and we will be interested in local privacy
as the primary constraint on protocols). As before, we will quantify the likelihood that a protocol
achieves a “good” outcome. Unlike before, our metric of interest for a multi-party protocol is its
sample complexity.
Definition 2.9. The sample complexity of a protocol A, denoted by SC(A), is the maximum
number of users appearing in the transcript over all inputs (x, y) and all random coins. If on all
inputs x and y PA [(x, y, z) 6∈ R] ≤ γ, we say A computes R with error at most γ. The randomized
sample complexity with error γ of a relation R is then defined as
SCγ(R) = minA:A computes R with error at most γ SC(A).
Let SCε,Nγ (R),SCε,Sγ (R), and SCε,Fγ (R) denote the sample complexities of ε-locally private proto-
cols computing R with error γ under noninteraction, sequential interaction, and full interaction
respectively.
Our two-party models are defined by an input pair (x, y), and we deliberately constrain our
multi-party models to be defined by a pair (x, y) as well. Thus a given two-party problem on a pair
of inputs induces a unique multi-party problem on the same inputs, and vice-versa. We note that
multi-party problems as we define them are unusual statistical estimation problems: their primary
use for us will be in proving lower bounds.
3 First Reduction: An Equivalence
We now prove an equivalence between a two-party problem’s communication complexity and the
induced multi-party problem’s sample complexity for private sequentially interactive protocols. To
do so, we first show that the equivalence holds when the two-party communication channel is noisy
in a specific way (Section 3.1). Pairing this with existing results relating communication complexity
over noisy and non-noisy channels (Section 3.2) completes the result (Section 3.3).
3.1 Noisy Two-party Communication
In the noisy two-party communication model, Alice and Bob may only communicate over a binary
symmetric channel.
Definition 3.1. For ε ∈ (0, 1/2), a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability ε BSCε
correctly transmits a bit b with probability 1/2 + ε and transmits 1− b with probability 1/2− ε. We
additionally suppose that the binary symmetric channel has feedback: the sender always sees the
received bit.
Let CCεγ(R) denote the communication complexity of R with error γ under the additional
requirement that communication occurs over BSCε. First, we show how to transform two-party
protocols over a binary symmetric channel with crossover probability depending on ε into multi-
party protocols.
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Lemma 3.1. Let R be a relation for some communication problem, ε ≥ 0, ε′ = eε−14(eε+1) , and
γ ∈ (0, 1). Then SCε,Sγ (R) = O
(
CCε
′
γ (R)
)
.
Proof. Let A2 be any protocol for the two-party problem over BSCε′ computing R with error γ.
Consider the first bit sent in A2. Without loss of generality, Alice sends this first bit f(x), where
x is Alice’s input. Since communication occurs over BSCε, with probability 1/2 + ε
′ Bob receives
f(x), and with probability 1/2 − ε′ Bob receives its negation.
We will use A2 to build a multi-party protocol Am. To simulate this bit, Am selects a new
(previously un-selected) agent, and the new agent takes one of two actions. If the agent has an
Alice input x, they apply randomized response to f(x): i.e. they send f(x) with probability e
ε
eε+1
and otherwise send (1− f(x)). If instead the agent has a Bob input y, they send a uniform random
bit. Thus the probability that the agent sends f(x) is
P [Alice input] · eεeε+1 + P [Bob input] · 12 = e
ε
2(eε+1) +
1
4
= 2e
ε
4(eε+1) +
eε+1
4(eε+1)
= 3e
ε+1
4(eε+1)
= 2(e
ε+1)
4(eε+1) +
eε−1
4(eε+1)
= 12 + ε
′.
It follows that the first bit of Am is distributed identically to the first bit of A2. Repeat-
ing this process for each bit sent in A2, Am induces an identical distribution over the bits out-
put, and thus computes R with error γ. Since each bit sent in A2 used a new user in Am,
SC(Am) = O
(
CCε
′
(A2)
)
. Since randomized response satisfies ε-differential privacy, the sequen-
tially interactive mechanism Am is ε-differentially private in the local model.
Next, we show how to transform multi-party protocols into two-party protocols over a binary
symmetric channel with crossover probability depending (in a slightly different way) on ε.
Lemma 3.2. Let R be a relation for some communication problem, 0 < ε = O(1), ε′ = eε−12(eε+1) ,
and γ, η > 0 such that γ + η < 1. Then CCε
′
γ+η(R) = O
(
1
η · SCε,Sγ (R)
)
.
Proof. Here, we define ε′ = e
ε−1
2(eε+1) , which differs from our previous ε
′ by a factor of 2. Let Am
be any sequentially interactive ε-locally private protocol for a multi-party problem computing R
with error γ and sample complexity n. By the following result from Bassily and Smith [4], we can
transform Am into a new, functionally equivalent protocol A′m in which each user sends only one
bit.
Lemma 3.3 (Theorem 4.1 in Bassily and Smith [4]). Given an ε-locally private protocol A with
expected number of randomizer calls T , there exists a sequentially interactive (ε, 0)-locally private
protocol A′ with expected number of users eε · T where each user sends a single bit (produced by a
call to a single ε-local randomizer). Moreover, there exists a deterministic function f on transcripts
such that f(Π(A′)) = Π(A), where Π(·) denotes a distribution over transcripts induced by a given
protocol with randomness is over the protocol and its samples.
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The cost is twofold. First, A′m requires O(n log(log(n))) bits of public randomness. Second, A′m
requires eεn users in expectation. By Markov’s inequality, the number of users can be bounded by
eεn
η at the cost of an η increase in failure probability.
We now transform A′m into a two-player protocol A2. The idea will be to have Alice and Bob
simulate A′m by randomly partitioning the users from the multi-party protocol between themselves,
and each simulating the role of their assigned users. Recall that for multi-party communication
problems, users are randomly assigned “Alice” or “Bob” data points, and so this random partition
will induce the correct distribution on data elements. Thus, A2 begins with Alice and Bob using
their shared public randomness to generate e
εn
η coin flips determining who will simulate which
agents.
Without loss of generality, suppose Alice simulates the first agent. Let
px = P [agent sends 1 | agent has Alice’s data x] ,
and let pmin = minx∈X px and pmax = maxx∈X px. Alice and Bob take one of two choices depending
on pmin and pmax.
Case 1: pmin+ pmax ≤ 1. Then Alice sends 1 with probability 12 + px2ε′(pmin+pmax) −
1
4ε′ and sends
0 with the remaining probability. Since
1
2 +
px
2ε′(pmin+pmax)
− 14ε′ = 12 + 2px−pmin−pmax4ε′(pmin+pmax)
≤ 12 + pmax−pmin4ε′(pmin+pmax)
= 12 +
eε+1
2(eε−1) · pmax−pminpmax+pmin
= 12 +
eε+1
2(eε−1) ·
[
1− 2pminpmax+pmin
]
≤ 12 + e
ε+1
2(eε−1)
[
1− 2eε+1
]
= 1
(where both inequalities use the fact that the agent sends output from an ε-local randomizer), and
similarly
1
2 +
2px−pmin−pmax
4ε′(pmin+pmax)
≥ 12 + e
ε+1
2(eε−1) · pmin−pmaxpmax+pmin
≥ 12 + e
ε+1
2(eε−1)
[
2
eε+1 − 1
]
= 0
these are valid probabilities. Next, as Alice sends the bit over BSCε′ , the probability that the
received bit is 1 is
(
1
2 + ε
′) (1
2 +
px
2ε′(pmin+pmax)
− 14ε′
)
+
(
1
2 − ε′
) (
1
2 − px2ε′(pmin+pmax) +
1
4ε′
)
= pxpmin+pmax .
With probability pmin+pmax, Alice and Bob “use” the received bit: that is, they enter this received
bit into their transcript and continue the protocol. With probability 1− pmin− pmax Alice and Bob
instead enter the bit 0 into their transcript (and omit the true received bit from the transcript)
and continue. Then P [enter 1 in transcript] (and P [enter 0 in transcript]) are identical in both the
two-party and multi-party protocols.
Case 2: pmin+pmax > 1. Then if we define p
′
min and p
′
max as 1−pmin and 1−pmax respectively, we
get p′min+p
′
max < 1. Let p
′
x = 1−px and have Alice send 0 with probability 12 + p
′
x
2ε′(p′
min
+p′max)
− 14ε′ ,
and Alice and Bob “use” the received bit (just as defined in Case 1) with probability p′min + p
′
max.
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Repeating the analysis from Case 1 for p′x, p
′
min, and p
′
max yields that P [use 0] (and P [use 1]) are
identical in both the two-party and multi-party protocols.
Combining Cases 1 and 2, Alice and Bob produce the same distribution over the first bit of
the protocol in A2 and Am. Since we can repeat this process for subsequent bits, by induction the
distribution over transcripts (and thus answers) is identical. Therefore A2 also computes R with
error γ. Moreover, there is a one-to-one correspondence between users in Am and bits in A2, so by
ε = O(1), CCε
′
γ+η(R) = O
(
1
η · SCε,Sγ (R)
)
.
3.2 Relating Noisy and Noiseless Communication
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2 relate the sample complexity of sequentially interactive ε-locally private multi-
party protocols and the communication complexity of two-party protocols over a binary symmetric
channel. The remaining step is to relate noisy and noiseless communication complexity. Fortunately,
one direction of this relationship follows almost immediately from previous work by Braverman and
Mao [7].
Lemma 3.4 (Theorem 3.1 in Braverman and Mao [7]). For every protocol A over BSCε with
feedback, there exists a protocol A′ over a noiseless channel that simulates A with CC(A′) =
O
(
ε2CCε(A)). Here, CC (A′) is the maximum over all inputs (x, y) of the expected number of
bits exchanged over the randomness of A′.
By Markov’s inequality, we get a high-probability version of their result for our setting.
Lemma 3.5. Let R be a relation for a two-party communication problem. Then for γ, η > 0 where
γ + η < 1, CCγ+η (R) = O
(
ε2
η · CCεγ(R)
)
.
It remains to upper bound noisy communication complexity using noiseless communication com-
plexity. Schulman [24] first studied the problem of interactive two-party communication through
noisy channels and showed how to simulate a noiseless channel using a binary symmetric channel
with small (< 1/240) crossover probability and a constant blowup in communication complexity.
Braverman and Rao [8] then improved this result to binary symmetric channels with crossover
probability bounded away from 1/8 by a constant.
Lemma 3.6 (Simplified Version of Theorem 2 in Braverman and Rao [8]). Let R be a relation
for a two-party communication problem, γ ∈ (0, 1), and 0 < p ≤ 1/8 − c where c = Ω(1). Then
CCpγ(R) = O (CCγ(R)).
One obstacle remains: Lemma 3.6 requires a channel C with crossover probability bounded
away from 1/8, while our channel C ′ may have crossover probability ε-close to 1/2. We therefore
use a standard amplification argument, replacing each bit over C with Θ(1/ε2) bits over C ′ and
taking the majority as the transmitted bit. This yields Lemma 3.7.
Lemma 3.7. Let R be a relation for a two-party communication problem. Then CCεγ(R) =
O
(
1
ε2
· CCγ(R)
)
.
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3.3 Equivalence
The results above come together in the following equivalence.
Theorem 3.8. Let R be a relation for some communication problem. Then for any ε = O(1) and
0 < γ, η = Ω(1) such that γ + η < 1, SCε,Sγ (R) = Θ
(
1
ε2
· CCγ+η(R)
)
.
Proof. We first show SCε,Sγ (R) = O
(
1
ε2
· CCγ(R)
)
. By Lemma 3.1, SCε,Sγ (R) = O
(
CCε1γ (R)
)
where
ε1 =
eε−1
4(eε+1) . Then, by Lemma 3.7, CC
ε1
γ (R) = O
(
1
ε2
1
· CCγ(R)
)
. Since ε = O(1), ε1 = Ω(ε), and
tracing back yields the claim.
Next, we show CCγ+η(R) = O
(
ε2 · SCε,Sγ (R)
)
. Since γ, η = Ω(1), by Lemma 3.5 CCγ+η(R) =
O
(
ε21 · CCε1γ+η/2(R)
)
where ε1 =
eε−1
2(eε+1) . By Lemma 3.2, CC
ε1
γ+η/2(R) = O
(
SCε,Sγ (R)
)
. Tracing
back and using ε1 = O(ε) implies the claim.
4 Separating Sequential and Full Interactivity
In this section, we use Theorem 3.8 to show that the hidden layers problem is hard for sequentially
interactive protocols (Corollary 4.1.1). In contrast, we show that the same problem is “easy” for
fully interactive protocols (Theorem 4.2). We start by introducing the problem below.
4.1 Hidden Layers Problem HL
In this section, we formally recap the hidden layers problem that drives our results. While Braver-
man [6] first proposed this problem, we imitate the presentation of Ganor et al. [18].
The hidden layers problem is parameterized by k ∈ N and denoted HL(k). It features a 24k-ary
tree T with directed edges from root to leaves and 2rs+1 layers where r = 228k and s = 28k. T thus
has a number of layers triply exponential in k and a number of leaves quadruply exponential in k.
Two players, Alice and Bob, each receive a small amount of information about T . Alice receives
(a, f) where a ∈ {0, 2, . . . , 2rs − 2} indexes an even-numbered layer, and f labels each vertex in
layer a of T with a single outgoing edge. Similarly, Bob receives (b, g) where b ∈ {1, 3, . . . , 2rs − 1}
indexes an odd-numbered layer, and g labels each vertex in layer b with a single outgoing edge.
Thus, Alice and Bob each have information about one “hidden layer” of T . Letting v be a leaf of
T , we say v is consistent with (a, f) (or (b, g)) if the path from the root to v goes through an edge
identified by f (or g, respectively).
The hidden layers problem is a search problem: Alice and Bob must output the same leaf v
consistent with both (a, f) and (b, g). Crucially, many such v exist. If at the end of protocol A
Alice and Bob output different leaves, or at least one of them outputs a leaf not consistent with at
least one of (a, f) and (b, g), we say A errs. A simplified illustration of the hidden layers problem
appears in Figure 2.
Ganor et al. [18] proved that the hidden layers problem has high communication complexity. To
do so, they constructed a specific distribution P over user inputs for their result. When we want
to specify the distribution P over user inputs, we write HL(k, P ).
Lemma 4.1 (Theorem 1 in Ganor et al. [18]). There exists constant k′ and input distribution P for
((a, f), (b, g)) such that, for every k ≥ k′ and protocol A with CC(A) ≤ 2k, PP [A errs on HL(k, P )] ≥
1− 2−k.
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Figure 2: A simplified instance of the hidden layers problem. Each node is labeled 0 (left) or 1 (right). For layers a
and b, these labels correspond to the correct child node. Leaves 4 and 6 are thus the only two leaves consistent with
the hidden layers a and b. Note that a true instance of the hidden layers problem is much larger.
In particular, Lemma 4.1 implies that Ω(2k) communication is necessary to achieve constant
success probability for HL(k, P ). Combining Theorem 3.8 and Lemma 4.1 gives the following
corollary.
Corollary 4.1.1. For ε = O(1) and γ = Ω(1), SCε,Sγ (HL(k, P )) = Ω
(
2k
ε2
)
.
4.2 Fully Interactive Upper Bound for HL
In this section we provide a fully interactive protocol HLSolver that solves HL(k) with a much
better sample complexity. HLSolver works by greedily following a path from the root to a leaf,
querying users to guide its path as it descends the tree.
Concretely, starting from the root, at each vertex v encountered, for all 24k children vj of v, the
analyst “asks” all n users if (v, vj) is the labelled edge in that level, recalling that each vertex in a
hidden layer specifies a single next edge to follow. To “answer”, each user xi compares the level ℓ
of vertex v and edge (v, vj) to their own data and replies as follows using randomized response. If
xi,1 = ℓ and (v, vj) ∈ xi,2, i.e. user i’s hidden layer is ℓ, and v is labelled with the (v, vj) edge, then
the user “votes yes” and transmits a draw from Ber
(
eε
′
/(eε
′
+ 1)
)
, where we write ε′ = ε/2 for
notational simplicity. Otherwise the user “votes no” and transmits a draw from Ber
(
1/(eε
′
+ 1)
)
.
Based on the responses, the protocol then chooses an edge out of v to follow, to obtain the next
vertex in the path at level ℓ + 1. When the protocol reaches a leaf, it proposes this leaf as the
solution. Pseudocode for HLSolver appears in Section 8.1.
Intuitively, during this process, the selection made by the protocol at any level that does not
correspond to a hidden layer is irrelevant: it can follow any outgoing edge and still be on track to
correctly solve the problem instance. To argue for correctness, all that is important is that for the
two (unknown) levels that correspond to hidden layers, the protocol correctly identifies the correct
labeled edge. At each of those levels, the bias induced by randomized response will be enough to
identify the correct edge with high probability. While this protocol is run, each user answers a
very large (triply exponentially many in k) number of queries: but for only one of those queries
is their response sampled from Ber
(
eε
′
/(eε
′
+ 1)
)
. For all other queries, their response is sampled
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from Ber
(
1/(eε
′
+ 1)
)
. Hence the privacy loss over the whole protocol is constant, and does not
accumulate with the number of queries. In contrast, a similar sequentially interactive protocol
would require new users for each of this large number of queries.
Note that an implication of [19] is that any fully interactive protocol that uses r local randomizer
calls per user can be converted into a sequentially interactive protocol with an O(r) factor blowup
in sample complexity. Consequently, it is necessary that any protocol witnessing an exponential
separation between the sample complexities of fully and sequentially interactive protocols must
make at least exponentially many queries per user.
Theorem 4.2. HLSolver is (ε, 0)-locally private and has constant success probability on HL(k)
given n = Ω
(
k
ε2
)
samples.
Proof. We first prove privacy. Recall that each user draws one of two samples, (a, f) or (b, g).
Accordingly, each user has only a single point in the transcript where they output a sample from
Ber
(
eε
′
eε′+1
)
, and the remainder of their outputs are all samples from Ber
(
1
eε′+1
)
. Thus, if we
compare the transcript distributions (restricted to a single user with the specified data) of π(a, f)
and π(b, g), there are at most two points in the transcript where their output distributions are not
identical. Therefore for any single-user transcript output z,
P[π(a,f)=z]
P[π(b,g)=z] ≤
eε
(eε′+1)2
1
(eε′+1)2
≤ eε.
HLSolver is thus (ε, 0)-locally private.
To reason about accuracy, we use the following simple result for randomized response.
Claim 4.3. Let x1, . . . , xn ∈ {0, 1} and for each xi draw yi ∼ Ber (exiε/(eε + 1)). Let y = 1n ·
∑n
i=1 xi
and y¯ = 1n · e
ε+1
eε−1 ·
(∑n
i=1 yi − neε+1
)
. Then with probability ≥ 1− β,
|y − y¯| ≤ ε+2
ε
√
2
√
ln(4/β)/n.
Proof. E [
∑
i yi] =
yeε+(n−y)
eε+1 =
y(eε−1)+n
eε+1 , so two Hoeffding bounds implies that with probability
≥ 1− β, ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
yi − y(e
ε−1)+n
eε+1
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
n ln(4/β)/2.
Thus
|y − y¯| ≤ eε+1eε−1
√
ln(4/β)/2n < ε+2
ε
√
2
√
ln(4/β)/n.
By Claim 4.3, with probability ≥ 1−β/2, whenever ℓ ∈ {a, b} but (v, vj) 6∈ f ∪ g, i.e. whenever
the current layer is hidden but vj is the wrong child node,
y¯ ≤ ε′+2
ε′
√
2
√
ln(24k+3/β)
n <
ε′+2
ε′
√
2
√
(4k+2)+ln(1/β)
n < 0.1
where the last inequality uses n > 100
(
ε′+2
ε′
√
2
)2
(4k + 2 + ln(1/β)).
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Now consider the situation where ℓ = a (ℓ = b is symmetric) and (v, vj) ∈ f , i.e. the current
layer is hidden and vj is the correct child node. Let A = {i | xi = (a, f)}. First, by a Hoeffding
bound with probability ≥ 1− β/4, |A| ≥ n2 −
√
n ln(4/β)/2. Thus by Claim 4.3
y¯ ≥ 12 −
√
ln(4/β)
2n − ε
′+2
ε′
√
2
√
(4k+2)+ln(1/β)
n > 0.2
where the last inequality uses the above lower bound on n and n > 25 ln(4/β). By a union bound,
with probability ≥ 1 − β when (v, vj) ∈ f then y¯ > 0.2 and vj is correctly chosen as the next
child.
Combining Corollary 4.1.1 and Theorem 4.2 yields an exponential in k separation between
sequentially and fully interactive protocols achieving constant success probability on HL.
5 Second Reduction: Round-Specific Separation
The equivalence given in Theorem 3.8 has one drawback: it does not preserve round complexity2.
As a result, we cannot use it to prove a separation between (k − 1) and k-round sequentially
interactive protocols. To do this, we instead prove a slightly different one-way reduction with a
looser dependence on ε.
5.1 Second Reduction
Theorem 5.1. Let A be a sequentially interactive ε-locally private protocol computing relation R
with error probability γ = Ω(1), and let 0 < η = Ω(1) such that γ+ η < 1. Then there exists a two-
party protocol A′ computing R with error probability ≤ γ + η such that CC(A′) = O˜ (eε · SC(A)).
Moreover, A and A′ have identical round complexity.
Proof. We start by using Lemma 3.3 to transform A into a different protocol A1 where each user
sends a single bit. A1 has the same round complexity as A but incurs an O(eε) blowup in expected
sample complexity. As before, we transform this into a bound that holds with probability 1 − η
at the cost of an increase in the failure probability by η and a constant 1/η blowup in sample
complexity.
Next, we transform A1 into a two-party protocol A′ for R. To do so, we run A1 and, for each
round of randomizer calls, uniformly at random assign (i.e. using public randomness generated
ahead of time) each randomizer call R to one of Alice and Bob for execution on their own data. Alice
and Bob then release the corresponding outputs simultaneously, and we proceed to the next round
of A1. Since A1 is sequentially interactive, each randomizer call is made using an unknown new
sample s. Furthermore, since each new sample is drawn from a uniform distribution as s ∼U {x, y},
R(s) is distributed identically to R executed on a uniformly random choice of Alice and Bob. At the
conclusion of A′, Alice and Bob mimic the output of the analyst. Since this choice depends entirely
on the communications thus far, which are distributed identically in A1 and A′, the distribution
over final answers is identical as well. Since A1 used O(eε · |SC(A)|) bits of communication, A′ does
as well. Finally, since each round of A1 leads to exactly one round of A′, A and A′ have identical
round complexity.
2In particular, the conversion between noiseless and noisy communication blows up round complexity in both
directions.
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6 Round-specific Separation for Sequential Interactivity
In this section, we introduce the pointer chasing problem and combine it with Theorem 5.1 to
prove a round-specific exponential sample complexity separation for sequentially interactive local
privacy.
6.1 The Pointer Chasing Problem
In the pointer chasing problem PC(k, ℓ), Alice and Bob respectively receive vectors a and b in [ℓ]ℓ
representing a sequence of pointers to locations in the other vector. The goal is to follow the chain
of pointers starting from a[1] and determine the value of the k’th pointer in this chain, where we
focus on problem instances with k ≪ ℓ. The difficulty is that while Alice knows a[1], to compute
the third pointer location she needs to know b[a[1]]. Pointer-chasing is therefore a natural candidate
for forcing interaction for nontrivial — i.e., communication o(k log(ℓ)) — solutions. An illustration
appears in Figure 3.
a
b
8 6 5 1 2 4 3 7
1 2 4 6 7 8 3 5
Figure 3: An instance of pointer chasing PC(5, 8) with solution 8.
Nisan and Wigderson [23] proved the following communication lower bound for PC(k, ℓ).
Lemma 6.1 (Theorem 2.6 in Nisan and Wigderson [23]). Let k < ℓlog(ℓ) . For any k-round protocol
A with success probability ≥ 2/3 on PC(k, ℓ) where Bob speaks first, CC(A) = Ω ( ℓk2
)
.
One obstacle remains before combining Theorem 5.1 with Lemma 6.1. The transformation
given in Theorem 5.1 assumes that each round of communication features Alice and Bob releasing
outputs simultaneously. In contrast, the model used for Lemma 6.1 supposes that Alice and Bob
speak in alternating rounds. We address this gap in Lemma 6.2.
Lemma 6.2. In the two-party communication model, any (k− 1)-round simultaneous communica-
tion protocol can be simulated by a k-round alternating communication protocol with Bob speaking
first.
Proof. In the simultaneous protocol, let (A1, B1), (A2, B2), . . . denote the outputs produced in each
round. Since the outputs are simultaneous, each At depends only on (A1, B1), . . . , (At−1, Bt−1)
and Alice’s data, and a similar dependence holds for Bt and Bob’s data. Alice and Bob can
therefore simulate a simultaneous communication protocol with alternating communication protocol
as follows: Bob begins by outputting B1, then Alice outputs A1 and A2, then Bob outputs B2 and
B3, and so on. This induces an identical distribution over final outputs Ak−1 and Bk−1 at the
expense of an additional round.
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Combining Lemma 6.1 with Theorem 5.1 yields Corollary 6.2.1.
Corollary 6.2.1. Let A be a (k−1)-round sequentially interactive ε-locally private protocol solving
PC(k, ℓ) with error probability γ ≤ 1/3 − c for c = Ω(1). Then SC(A) = Ω ( ℓ
eεk2
)
.
6.2 k-round Upper Bound
We now provide a k-round sequentially interactive protocol, PCSolver, achieving much better
sample complexity on PC. PCSolver is a straightforward private version of the trivial O(k log(ℓ))
communication solution to PC where Alice and Bob alternate communicating the next pointer
in sequence, bit by bit. Local privacy forces this communication to pass through randomized
response for each bit, and sequential interaction forces the use of a new group of users for each bit.
Pseudocode for PCSolver appears in Appendix 8.2. As both the privacy and accuracy proofs for
Theorem 6.3 are nearly identical to those of Theorem 4.2, we defer them to Appendix 8.3.
Theorem 6.3. PCSolver is (ε, 0)-locally private, solves PC(k, ℓ) with error ≤ 1/6 and has
SC(A) = O˜
(
k log(ℓ)
ε2
)
.
In conjunction with Corollary 6.2.1, Theorem 6.3 yields an exponential separation in ℓ between
(k − 1)- and k-round sequentially interactive locally private protocols for PC(k, ℓ).
7 Discussion and Open Problems
Using tools from communication complexity, we have exhibited an exponential sample complexity
separation between the sequentially interactive and fully interactive models of local differential
privacy. This raises several interesting questions.
1. It has been known since Kasiviswanathan et al. [20] that the query complexity of locally pri-
vate protocols is polynomially related to the query complexity of algorithms in the statistical
query model from learning theory [21], for which there are a number of lower bounds. Since
query complexity and sample complexity are equivalent for sequentially interactive protocols,
and since no separation between the two models was known until very recently [19], this was
widely viewed as an equivalence that might also hold for sample complexity. Now that we
know there is in fact an exponential gap between the sample complexity of fully interactive
protocols and sequentially interactive protocols (and hence the query complexity of algorithms
in the statistical query model), this again raises the question of the power of locally private
learning when protocols are not restricted to be sequentially interactive. In particular, is
there an algorithm that can learn parity functions in d dimensions with sample complexity
that is sub-exponential in d? We conjecture that the answer remains “no” but don’t know
how to prove it.
2. Might there be larger than exponential separations between sequentially and fully interactive
locally private protocols? Our results leave this possibility open. To refute it, one would
like to demonstrate a reduction that takes as input a fully interactive protocol, and outputs
a sequentially interactive protocol inducing the same transcript distribution with “only” an
exponential increase in sample complexity. Joseph et al. [19] give a reduction in this style
that is tight in terms of what they call the “compositionality” of the fully interactive protocol,
but their reduction does not give any guarantees in terms of n.
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8 Appendix
8.1 Pseudocode for HLSolver
Algorithm 1 HLSolver
1: procedure HLSolver(ε, n,T )
2: Initialize current node v ← root node
3: Initialize level ℓ← 0
4: Set ε′ ← ε/2
5: while ℓ <= 2rs − 1 do
6: Initialize NextNodeFound ← 0
7: Initialize child index j ← 0
8: while not NextNodeFound and j <= 24k − 1 do
9: for users i = 1, 2, . . . , n do
10: Initialize bi ← 0
11: if xi,1 = ℓ and (v, vj) ∈ xi,2 then
12: User i sets bi ← 1
13: end if
14: User i publishes yi ∼ Ber
(
ebiε
′
/(eε
′
+ 1)
)
15: end for
16: y¯ ← 1n · e
ε′+1
eε′−1 ·
(∑n
i=1 yi − neε′+1
)
17: if y¯ > 0.2 or vj = v24k−1 then
18: Set new current node v ← vj
19: NextNodeFound ← 1
20: end if
21: end while
22: ℓ← ℓ+ 1
23: end while
24: Output v
25: end procedure
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8.2 Pseudocode for PCSolver
Algorithm 2 PCSolver
1: procedure PCSolver(ε, k, ℓ,m)
2: Initialize Alice or Bob indicator z1 ← 0
3: Initialize current location z2 ← 1
4: for pointer index j = 1, 2, . . . , k do
5: Initialize next pointer s← 0
6: for possible pointer value bits b = 1, 2, . . . , ⌈log(ℓ)⌉ do
7: for each i of m new users do
8: Initialize qi ← 0
9: if xi,1 = z1 and bit b of xi,2[z2] is 1 then
10: User i sets qi ← 1
11: end if
12: User i outputs yi ∼ Ber (eqiε/(eε + 1))
13: end for
14: y¯ ← 1m · e
ε+1
eε−1 ·
(∑
i yi − meε+1
)
15: s← s+ 2b−2(sgn(y¯ − 0.15) + 1)
16: end for
17: z1 ← −z1 + 1
18: z2 ← s
19: end for
20: Output z2
21: end procedure
8.3 Proof of Theorem 6.3
Proof. First, we prove privacy. Since PCSolver is sequentially interactive, each user produces
a single output. As each output is produced by ε-randomized response, i.e. drawn from either
Ber
(
eε
eε+1
)
or Ber
(
1
eε+1
)
, PCSolver is ε-locally private.
We now prove accuracy. For each pointer index in [k], the protocol computes the next location
in ℓ bit by bit, using ⌈log(ℓ)⌉ queries, each to a new group of m users. By a similar invocation of
Claim 4.3 as in the proof of Theorem 4.2, given group size
m > 100
(
ε+2
ε
√
2
)2
(ln(k⌈log(ℓ)⌉) + ln(2/β)),
with probability 1−β all k⌈log(ℓ)⌉ queries return the correct bit. PCSolver thus usesmk⌈log(ℓ)⌉ =
O
(
k log(ℓ) log(k log(ℓ))
ε2
)
samples to solve PC(k, ℓ) with error probability ≤ 1/6.
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